In 1997 the World Bank's two vice-presidents for Sub-Saharan Africa attributed a significant improvement in Africa's growth prospects to the advent of a new generation of leaders, replacing their "once largely statist and corrupt" predecessors. This paper begins by tracing the evolution of African chief executives over the past two decades. Of 48 holding office on 1 st January 1999, 22 were in power a decade earlier and eight already ten years before that. Examination of ten countries, with focus on Kenya and Zambia, raises the question: why, after these incumbents had presided over economic catastrophe, were socio-political structures unable to replace them with better leaders? A review of leading treatments of the political economy of economic reform highlights the dichotomy between interest-group analysis, versus studies that accord a major role to the unpredictable advent of individuals with qualities that, by promoting policy reform, help launch their countries onto paths of rapid growth. Given the multitude of problems facing most African countries, even leaders of extraordinary ability and "vision" would find it difficult to guide them rapidly through the required reforms. However, a few concrete steps on the leadership's part to raise agricultural production and promote export of labor-intensive manufactures would greatly increase the prospects for accelerated growth. The paper challenges other social scientists to tell us more about how African social structures can create power bases for "visionary" individuals. In addition, can donors and other outsiders help nurture "visionary" leaders who will promote rather than hinder growth and development? Apart from withholding support from, and even active opposition to, corrupt incumbents, many options exist for helping the former implement reforms. Assisting them to gain power, while a desirable goal, is more problematic.
preconditions that stimulate constructive leadership as a puzzle and a topic worthy of future research. It then considers how outsiders might enhance the role of leadership in African growth and development. Section V summarizes and concludes.
In order to relate our discussion to the socio-political context, and yet come to grips as rapidly as possible with the issue of national leadership and economic growth in Africa, we relegate to an annex some gleanings from the literature on general concepts of leadership. Table 1 lists the chief executives of 48 African countries as of January 1, 1979, 1989 and 1999 . In 22 countries the same individual was in power on the two latter dates, in eight of these cases he (the list contains no women) held power already 20 years ago. The stability of national leadership is noteworthy, raising the question as to where MS find a new generation of leaders. 3, 4 Moreover, the presence of 26 new leaders since 1989 does not automatically mean that MS' old model has given way to their new one, nor does a leader's perseverance rule out the possibility that a formerly statist and corrupt posture has yielded to one of "accountable pragmatism".
I. Recent evolution of national leadership in Africa
The authors have spent significant periods of time in countries where in our view the quality of the chief executive's leadership and its evolution (or nonevolution) have had a major impact on policy change and hence, growth and development. We feel it appropriate to appraise at least partially the MS thesis in those and a few other countries that have recently been the focus of international attention. 3 MS do not explicitly limit their assessment to country chief executives. Other prominent individuals can have a major impact on economic policy and its outcomes. The justification for confining our analysis to chief executives is threefold: in most countries they constitute the single locus of leadership with the greatest potential for good or harm; as a rule they set the tone for the national administration; and, finally, descending to the next nominal level would hopelessly complicate the analysis. 4 A tabulation of chief executives who either held military rank before assuming power, or accorded themselves such rank (other than commander-in-chief) once in power, yields the following count: 1979: 12; 1989: 19; 1999: 11. In section IV we raise the question as to how far donors' military aid may have augmented the military's role in government. MS rightly refer to "freedom from armed conflict" as a prerequisite for social and economic progress. That currently rules out a subset of African countries from potential applicability of the MS improved-leadership hypothesis-notably Angola, both Congos, GuineaBissau, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan, accounting for 90 million people or 15% of Africa's population in 1996. 5 It also raises questions about the set of countries intervening in the Congo (DRC) civil war that broke out after MS' article was written, namely Angola (Strike Two!), Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. And finally, one must mention countries that are engaged in armed conflict-Eritrea and Ethiopia-or where a warlord having prevailed in armed conflict has a tenuous hold on power, notably Liberia.
The following review focuses on Kenya and Zambia, the cases best known to the authors from personal experience, and concludes with brief remarks about eight other countries.
Kenya. This country showed early potential as a star of African development. Quality of leadership has much to do with its ongoing failure to realize that potential.
There It is more controversial to assert that Kenyatta set in motion, or tacitly encouraged, a chain of events that imposed two crippling burdens on the Kenya economy. Firstly, it was under Kenyatta that corruption took on a macroeconomic dimension through the volume of resources siphoned out of public coffers, via the Treasury as well as the central bank. Secondly, it was in his day that bribery by foreign contractors and machinery suppliers, and acceptance of those bribes by Kenyan politicians, launched a plethora of inefficient state enterprises. Oriented overwhelmingly oriented towards import substitution, these enterprises continue to burden Kenya with an inefficient industrial structure that impedes its entry into export markets. 5 Tabulated from World Bank (1998a), pp. 12-14 and 33. 6 Gray watched from a close vantage point as Kenyatta's last white cabinet minister, Bruce Mackenzie (Agriculture), inaugurated Kenya's macro-corruption learning curve by soliciting and taking German bribes for a government sugar project.
In essence, Kenyatta saw his role as that of a traditional chief, maintaining political stability, distributing benefits to the population within the resource constraints defined by his finance ministry, and not begrudging his ministers (or his family) a larger share in the public purse than would accrue to them through any politically acceptable direct compensation. Had
Kenyatta-well in advance of his time-anticipated the steps by which some nations that were poor in the 1960s and 1970s have subsequently become fast-growing, newly industrializing countries (NICs), there is little doubt that he had the political clout to restrain his rent-seeking ministers and make the necessary policy improvements. But this was not the development paradigm of the era, and it is hard to discern any circumstances under which Kenyatta could have acquired such a vision.
The scene now shifts to the early 1990s, when the outside world had forced Moi to reintroduce multi-party politics in the election ultimately held in December 1992. Moi was now discredited and unpopular in virtually all urban areas, a fact reflected in his receiving only 36 percent of the popular vote, even though it was enough to win reelection. Three men split all but 2 percent of the remaining votes. Two of these, a Kikuyu and a Luo, represented factions of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) that had registered as a single party one year before. The third candidate led the Kikuyu-dominated Democratic Party. Their shares of the popular vote were 26 percent, 18 percent, and 19 percent, respectively.
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Who were these men? One, a businessman and one-time cabinet minister under Moi, had suffered a stroke while in political detention and spent the year before FORD's formation recuperating in Britain. He remained visibly handicapped. The Luo, a one-time vice-president, was believed to be in his eighties, and died within two years of the election. The third candidate, also an ex-vice president and trained as an economist, 8 was widely viewed as having compiled an undistinguished record in various government posts, and also implicated in large-scale bribery, inter alia in connection with a sugar project that burdened the economy with heavy losses.
Moi doggedly held power for the next five years, weathering a sharp spurt in inflation (from 19% in 1991 to 46% in 1993) caused by Treasury and central bank leakages orchestrated by his associates. The most bizarre of these was a special export bonus, moved in the National
Assembly by the then finance minister (and simultaneously vice-president), for a shipment of 7 Electoral data from EIU Country Profile: Kenya, 1997-98 gold jewelry that turned out to be sand on inspection by Swiss customs (the so-called The transition was peaceful as well. Incoming president Frederick Chiluba was widely feted, locally and abroad, as a democrat and a man of courage and conviction. His early speeches conveyed determination to rebuild the economy and repair Zambia's fractured society.
The donor community, convinced of Chiluba's commitment, responded immediately and lavishly.
However, within months of the new administration taking office, one of Chiluba's most respected ministers resigned, citing high-level corruption. Subsequently, the government declared a state of emergency over an alleged UNIP plot (the "zero option" scheme), and this 8 In the 1960s he was widely described as one of the very few persons, if not the only one, to have graduated from Makerere University College (Kampala) with a First in economics. 9 Published statistics put it at 0.14% p.a., differing insignificantly from zero given data errors. 10 World Bank (1998a), pages 12-14 and 32-22. overreaction-none of the alleged conspirators was ever convicted-led to the departure of several key ministers at the forefront of Zambia's economic reforms.
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Chiluba's foot-dragging in response to a 1993 donor ultimatum to remove known drugrunners from Cabinet, as well as his lack of action on reports by the Anti-Corruption Commission, raised questions about his willingness to deal with "governance" issues. 12 His commitment to "transparency" also rang hollow when the government refused to release the official report on a Zambia Air Force plane crash in Gabon that killed the national soccer team.
Dismissal of the deputy minister of mines for urging speedy privatization of the copper mining parastatal, ZCCM, exposed Chiluba's lack of support for reform in this vital sector.
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Perhaps the key event symbolizing Chiluba's failed leadership was the way he steered a constitutional amendment through Parliament to disqualify his predecessor from standing in the 1996 election. 14 The donor community was unequivocal in its opposition, and Chiluba repeatedly promised that the constitution would not be changed. In the event, Kaunda was ruled ineligible and UNIP boycotted the election, leaving MMD to win all but three seats. Thus, within two elections, Chiluba and MMD had de facto recreated a one-party state. Notwithstanding this advantage, they have nonetheless failed to manage the economy effectively.
The pace (and even direction) of policy change deteriorated from early 1995. With accelerated inflation and debt, along with plummeting foreign reserves, aggravated by massive ZCCM losses, Zambia is now in a worse position than before MMD and Chiluba came to power.
Kaunda, for all his failings, did not allow the mining sector to collapse. Opening Parliament in January 1999, Chiluba apologized to the Zambian people for his government's mistakes and the lack of economic progress.
Like Kenya and many other African countries, Zambia provides fertile ground for testing hypotheses about the interplay of interest groups and its impact on the acceptance and 11 The zeal with which alleged UNIP conspirators were prosecuted contrasts with government's inaction vis-à-vis the "black mamba" terror campaign during the run-up to the 1996 elections. Widely believed to be MMD-sponsored, this escapade led to several deaths. 12 Prior to his appointment the foreign minister had been denied entry to Germany for drug-related activity. 13 This was reinforced by Chiluba's hiring of ZCCM's disgraced former chief executive to lead the negotiations for its sale. Though the history of this episode has yet to be unraveled, the costs to the country of delay and foregone investment run into the billions of dollars. Uganda. This country may be the leading illustration of MS' hypothesis-in any case, the World Bank's posture is one of (qualified) satisfaction with its economic performance.
President Museveni held power already in January 1986 from which time he was widely praised for his enlightened stewardship. Therefore, describing him in 1997 as one of the "new" generation of African leaders appears to stretch the point. In 1991, mass demonstrations spearheaded by students forced Ratsiraka into exile in
France. The subsequent elections brought Albert Zafy into power in 1993. Average per capita 14 The grounds for excluding Kaunda were that he was born in Malawi, and had already served two terms as president. Ironically, there is strong evidence that Chiluba himself was born in the former Belgian Congo. 15 In this connection see Bates and Collier (1993) , upon whose theses we comment in the next section. 16 The other two are Congo-Brazzaville and Madagascar.
GDP growth is measured at -1. WH find that none of the conditions investigated, including these three, was necessary or sufficient for reform. The 13 countries researched for the IIE conference, none of them in Africa, present at least one "partial counterexample" for every hypothesis. 18 However, WH single out three hypotheses, including the aforementioned (1) and (2), as receiving "quite strong support." The third is that reform requires a strong political base, specifically in the form of legislative support (this condition was not significant in countries with nondemocratic systems;
Poland is presented as the sole democratic exception).
WH cite a second tier of three hypotheses as receiving sufficient corroboration to merit being "borne in mind by any reform-minded leader." These assert that chances of sustained reform are enhanced by (1) an environment of economic crisis, (2) a new administration's "honeymoon" vis-à-vis public opinion, and (3) presentation of a "comprehensive program" of reform.
When do leaders merit the characterization "visionary"? According to WH, they must be All of the factors identified as key to the success of economic reform in the recent literature are, in fact, dependent on effective political leadership. These include the government's level of understanding of economic issues, its commitment to reform, the insulation of key technocrats, and its ability to build coalitions on behalf of reform.
In a companion piece in NW, Brautigam highlights institutional issues, notably the weak implementation of reform by national bureaucracies, and offers little hope of rapid improvement.
Both leaders and followers, she says, "are ensnared by the politics of patronage." Leaders rule through "patrimonial ties rather than rational-legal norms…Rapid expansion, frequent 'shuffling' of personnel, and political instability have…thwarted efforts to develop a bureaucratic culture…" Brautigam believes that "committed leaders can work within the kind of state-society linkages found in patrimonial governance systems, if they concentrate first on reforming a small number of critical agencies," e.g. the central bank, tax service, and/or judiciary. However, she does not address the preconditions for committed leadership to emerge in a given country, nor suggest how outsiders might enhance the probability of this happening.
Asia. In a volume that otherwise accentuates interest group theory (Bates & Krueger, 1993 Executive power served several functions. First, it permitted the government to cut through previous patterns of rent-seeking both within and outside the bureaucracy. Second, it eliminated from the economic policy agenda contending policy platforms that have affected the nature of economic policy-making in a number of other developing countries, often through harsh repression of opposition that was justified by national security concerns. Finally, executive power infused government deliberations in general and the determination of economic actions in particular with an urgency and an authority that they might not otherwise have had, in part by concentrating decision-making authority within the government itself.
Latin America. Denying that "successful economic policy in developing countries is…the product of pure forces of history"-i.e. an outcome of interest group interplayHarberger (1993) asserts:
Far from it, in every case about which I have close knowledge, the policy would in all likelihood have failed (or never got started) but for the efforts of a key group of individuals, and within that group, one or two outstanding leaders.
Harberger's purpose is to "pay tribute to a small number of such leaders." The paper …provide(s) some idea of the special traits that have made these particular people essential to the modernization processes of their nations' economies. Campos [Brazil-planning minister] the forthright "doer of his duty," oblivious to the personal cost to him. Vegh Williams [Uruguayfinance minister] the artful and imaginative sapper, who knew just where to set the explosive charge to demolish the old system, and who took charge of the construction and much later of the defense and perpetuation of a new, liberalized system. De Castro [Chile-finance minister], whose exclusive leadership traits defy description but remind me more than anything of some great athletic coaches, whose mere presence inspires team members to superhuman efforts and incredible sacrifices. Büchi [Chile-finance minister], the most "modern man" in the group, with the technical know-how to capture in his own mind the workings as well as the flaws of an entire system of national economic policy, whose motto could well be that one should look to intimate knowledge of a problem to find the key to its solution. Aspe [Mexico-finance minister], who presided over one of the most careful, most artful, most extensive, and to date most successful programs of privatization that the developing world has seen and who had the discipline and fortitude to ensure the prudent use of the proceeds. Gil Diaz [Mexico-undersecretary, revenue] , who comes as close as anyone to being the architect of Mexico's reformed and modernized tax system, and who led a massive administrative reform, including the most concentrated fight against corruption that I have ever witnessed. But for each of these people, the history of his country would be different.
Harberger pays a final tribute to "the great achievements and indomitable courage" of Argentine economics minister Domingo Cavallo, whose reforms were then (1993) still in process.
The country paper in Williamson-Haggard making the strongest case for the primacy of visionary leadership, Piñera on Chile, distinguishes "real leaders" from politicians. His plea:
"Surely among those strong-willed enough to struggle their way to high political power are some who are also strong-willed enough to fight for a principle."
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In the Bates-Krueger volume, Grindle and Thoumi (GT 1993) give great weight to leadership in Ecuador. According to them, "much of the content and timing of policy changes can be understood by viewing them from the perspective of leadership by policy elites."
21 Three successive Ecuadorian presidents had firm ideas about what policy changes were required to resolve the country's economic crisis. However, the political resources available to them severely limited their ability to implement the changes.
GT apply interest-group analysis to explain the opposition confronted by the reformers.
The net outcome was "a decade of muddling toward adjustment". GT surmise the Ecuadorian chief executives may have increased the amount of "muddling" by "disregarding the problems of sustainability and choosing not to engage in greater consensus building prior to making decisions".
Africa. Turning to Africa, Gyimah-Boadi & van de Walle list several African ministers as leaders of "technocratic change teams," wielding authority that was delegated from the respective heads of state. 22 The authors note that when these ministers lost that support, the reforms typically lost momentum. What of prospects for the future? GBW's answer:
The question is how new political and economic values can be engendered among African leaders…There is no clear answer…, since idiosyncratic national factors necessarily play a critical role in the career of any political leader…Perhaps creating and mobilizing individual leaders of the kind that social science cannot predict will be necessary to put Africa on the path of rapid growth…Nonetheless, we should not expect more than slow progress towards the developmental state in the near future. NW (1996) , pages 229, 232.
An alternative view: Interest group theory
We view the doctrine frequently labeled "interest group theory" as offering the greatest contrast to the Great Man Theory in explaining policy change. Editing a 1993 anthology entitled
Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy
Reform, Bates and Krueger (BK) , who are also the authors of its summary chapter, minimize the role of leadership. They explicitly dismiss the "unitary actor model" in favor of interest group theory.
24 Their index omits "leadership".
The chapter in BK devoted to Zambia, authored by Bates and Collier, highlights the dichotomy between Great Man and interest group analysis. We return to this below.
Writing in 1996 for the Journal of Economic Literature, Rodrik provides "an economist's perspective on the political economy of policy reform." He cites the finding by WH on "visionary leadership", but the thrust of his analysis is an economist's variant of interest group theory. For Rodrik the primary questions are (1) why institutions for compensating losers from reform are not more common and effective, and (2) how it is-short of attributing myopia to the population, which he dismisses-that the preponderance of public opinion rejects policies that evidence from many countries shows will accelerate growth and make a large majority better off.
Rodrik finds the first question puzzling and in need of further research. For the second question he presents scenarios whereby uncertainty about the identity of the winners and losers leaves enough voters or interest groups with expected losses to turn the tide against reform.
East Asia. Specifically for this region, Rodrik accords a major role to the "top political leadership". There he argues that the absence of powerful industrial and landed interest groups, and comparative equity in income distribution, freed the leaders to concentrate on expanding rather than redistributing the pie, and to this end, on "supervis[ing] the bureaucracy closely and mak [ing] sure that the bureaucrats assisted rather than hindered private entrepreneurship".
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Africa. Applying interest group theory to Zambia, Bates and Collier (BC 1993) start by characterizing president Kaunda as "strong" and "possessing a wide range of discretion". He "dominated the process of policy making". It was he "who secured the adoption of the [1985] reform program." He alone supported it in the UNIP Central Committee (CC), and was joined only by the finance minister and central bank governor in supporting it in Cabinet.
Yet, "the backing of only the president and his technocrats was not sufficient to guarantee whether interest group theory is as relevant to the poor performance of the Chiluba administration as an analysis seeking the causes of incompetent and corrupt leadership. For instance, is it useful analytically to treat drug-and gun-runners, and the asset-strippers who fostered ZCCM's ruin, as an "interest group"?
Turning to Rodrik's questions-compensation of losers and rejection by public opinion.
Both are clearly relevant to Africa 28 as illustrations of economic mismanagement by authoritarian governments.
For question (1) we suggest the hypothesis of deficient leadership-i.e. a "visionary leader" would be alert to the rationale for compensating losers and would promote appropriate institutions. With respect to question (2), "public opinion" in Africa has an amorphous character-popular perceptions are heavily influenced by state-owned and manipulated media. Fischer, Hernández-Catá and Khan (FHK 1998) 29 give as first priority raising the rate of private investment. To achieve this, and thereby raise productivity and growth, they list eight conditions. In the course of structural adjustment programs supported by the IMF and the donor community, most African countries have, say FHK, registered progress in fulfilling each of the conditions. However, the threshold of sustained growth has not yet been crossed, and in most countries, more remains to be done on each point.
The eight conditions are: • Maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment; 27 The occasions in question occurred in 1977, 1979, 1980 and 1983. 28 Africa does not feature in Rodrik's analysis. He mentions it only once. 29 Fischer is the Fund's First Deputy Managing Director, Khan is director of the Fund Institute, Hernández-Catá is associate director of the African Department.
• "Far-reaching improvements in governance to avoid capricious interference with private activity and to develop and maintain a transparent and stable legal and regulatory environment", 30 thereby reducing investors' risks;
• Trade liberalization;
• Privatization;
• Civil service reform;
• Banking reform;
• Liberalization of the agricultural sector; and
• Improving labor market flexibility and competitiveness.
FHK nowhere refer explicitly to quality of leadership-perhaps this is too much to expect of an institution that has to tread a fine line between advocacy and diplomacy. However, we find the quality of leadership to be implicit in FHK's reference to improved governance, and in a separate statement that sustaining the recent rise in Africa's growth "depends on whether policymakers take the requisite actions."
FHK's conditions amount, they admit, to a "long agenda". Gyimah-Boadi & van de
Walle warned us earlier not to expect rapid progress. Brautigam finds institutional weaknesses so deep-seated that she wants policy makers to focus initially on reforming just a handful of agencies. We agree with her, but will propose here an even narrower short-term agenda, comprising a handful of steps that we believe might jump-start the growth process, and that should be feasible even if requiring "committed" or "visionary" leadership of the sort that, unfortunately, few African countries enjoy at the moment.
The authors are staunch members of the school advocating-we claim no originality here-that no African economy can accelerate and sustain growth without following some variant of the Asian model that accelerated growth in the agricultural sector while reorienting activity towards the global economy and initiating export of labor-intensive manufactures. 31 On the other hand, we do not belong to the laissez-faire branch of this school (if indeed it still exists), which used to be paraphrased as saying, "get the prices right and investment and exports will follow." On the contrary, we accept the lessons of countries such as Korea, Malaysia and 30 FHK (1998), p. 19 (emphasis in original). One may reasonably interpret this condition as also forestalling capture of regulatory instruments by private interests. 31 Lindauer & Roemer (1994) is just one close-to-home work out of many on this theme.
Singapore that strategic intervention by the national leadership can engage and energize domestic entrepreneurial talent, increase an economy's attractiveness to foreign investors, and help make entry into export markets profitable.
Illustrations from three African countries
What kinds of strategic intervention would be useful in Africa? Here we turn to experiences from three African countries, one of which (Mauritius) has taken off economically, while the other two (Senegal and Tanzania) are still languishing. Senegal has long aspired to energize its manufacturing sector, and through a New Industrial Policy introduced in 1986 with IFI urging and funding, tried harder than any other franc-zone country to offset the drag of an overvalued exchange rate that was finally halved 32 Average per capita GDP growth was about -1% during 1962-71. 33 We say "partial" stability because control over inflation has not prevented Senegal (and its CFA partners) from running budget and balance of payments deficits driving its foreign debt to unsustainable levels.
(relative to the French franc) in January 1994. The Policy included duty drawbacks for imported inputs; an export bonus, which ultimately collapsed under fiscal pressure; and a bitter tussle with the trade unions to stem wage inflation. According to a senior government official quoted in Bloom and Sachs (1999) , a Korean apparel firm seeking to expand its exports to the US from a site not subject to US import quotas, established a plant in Tanzania. 36 However, it lost its principal US customer due to delays in shipping caused by "obstruction and hassles by port and customs authorities."
Once again, the issue of national leadership arises: if President Mkapa were convinced of the importance of getting Tanzania aboard the manufactured export bandwagon, could he not start by establishing and monitoring a task force that would smooth the way for nontraditional exports through the port of Dar es Salaam?
Towards a clearly defined, manageable policy agenda for African leaders
Undoubtedly most African chief executives are aware of East Asian role models and would be delighted if history were to credit them with inaugurating their country's path to industrialization. However, they perceive such a plethora of hurdles, both domestic and foreign-the latter including 'dumping' by Asian competitors, as well as industrial country import quotas-that they don't know where to start, and end up doing little beyond paying lip service to the need to industrialize and export.
What do we suggest a "visionary" African leader might do to promote policies that will accelerate his/her country's growth? In the first place, he/she has to eschew the personal rentseeking that is now ubiquitous. He/she has to recognize that the example set by a corrupt chief executive permeates all branches and layers of government, from top to bottom in the executive, legislature and judiciary, and undermines growth by engendering FHK's "capricious interference" with private activity. Documented examples from Africa are too numerous to cite.
Deleterious rent-seeking in Africa is not limited to raiding the treasury or central bank or shaking down contractors. Taking control of the estates being vacated by colonial owners, founder-president Hastings Banda and his associates in Malawi's political elite lost interest in an agricultural policy oriented towards the rural masses.
In suggesting restraint, we are not trying to impose the spartan (and unattainable) condition that a chief executive or minister limit his/her compensation to the nominal salary that most African politicians feel can safely be listed in a published budget. Obviously, additional compensation in cash and kind will be channeled through nominally unrelated appropriations. It is when a leader draws rents exceeding a reasonable estimate of the opportunity cost of his/her time and effort that the title "visionary" becomes inappropriate.
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Unfortunately the converse to this rule does not hold-that is, the perceived honesty of a chief executive is no guarantee against a society being permeated with corruption. The leading case is Nyerere, who showed that imposition of an ideology tantamount to statism can institutionalize rent-seeking in a country that gained independence with a fair chance of keeping it in check.
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Secondly, the leader has to perceive the need for his/her country eventually to comply with the eight conditions cited by FHK. As they admit, this is a long agenda, and in the short run no African country will satisfy most of the policy conditions of today's NICs. Moreover, as regards the governance condition, not all the countries qualifying as NICs represent attractive models, even if expansion of the middle class, concomitant with rapid growth, has spurred institutional development and government accountability in several Asian and Latin American countries.
Some readers will accuse us of the narrow-minded view that "visionary" leadership in Africa is tantamount to adherence to IMF, World Bank and other donor conditionalities. Our answer: let these readers point to any low-income country that has sustained rapid growth of per capita GDP without making significant progress on most of FHK's eight conditions, or where fulfillment of some other condition (apart from the obvious restoration of law and order) has proven to be more important than those on the list. Furthermore, there is no need to adjust within the explicit framework of an IMF/Bank program. Indeed, resultant growth is likely to be faster and less subject to interruption if a government has the discipline to promote adjustment without Bretton Woods support.
36 Bloom and Sachs (1999) , page 270, footnote 90. 37 Cf. Klitgaard (1988) have a growth impact in the short run? Our answer was anticipated by the preceding country anecdotes. The first priority is to get started on labor-intensive manufactured exports. 40 Here a "visionary" leader can and will pull the available levers in the bureaucracy and civil society to counter "capricious interference", convince foreign and domestic investors of the priority that he/she attaches to promoting exports, and satisfy them that his/her country offers a profitable environment in which to produce and sell. Since a single act of support will rarely suffice, the leader must monitor the situation and be prepared to sustain his/her intervention as long as necessary to create a stable and secure environment for investment.
A caution
We do not wish to be interpreted as saying that, to qualify as "visionary", an African chief executive must busy him-or herself pursuing every instance where a businessman (or woman) calls the president's office to complain about a brush with the bureaucracy. In the excitement of early days in office, some leaders have tried to do this, and there are no cases where a sustained increase in investment, output and exports can be attributed to such behavior.
Indeed the effect can be perverse if the leader develops personal attachments and dislikes that bias government's posture. At the same time, his/her attention is diverted from weightier issues of political and macroeconomic stability.
What we are saying is that a "visionary" leader will identify transactions that are strategic from the viewpoint of establishing an enabling environment for agricultural expansion and manufactured exports, will ensure that he or she is informed speedily of blockages, and will 39 Establishing an enabling environment for agriculture is one of the sine qua nons of growth policy. Succumbing to an urban bias against agriculture, African governments have burdened the sector to the point where food imports absorb roughly 15% of export revenue. intervene rapidly and firmly to overcome them. This in turn presupposes establishment and support of a modest organization that will monitor strategic areas, alert the leader to problems, help design corrective measures, and follow up on their implementation. Such a structure might be as modest as an export facilitation task force.
IV. Preconditions for emergence of new "visionary" leaders in Africa
If the quality of top leadership has been a serious impediment to policy reform and accelerated growth in Africa, what are the chances of significant improvement in the foreseeable future?
Strong, "visionary" leaders do not emerge like Venus from the sea, in Africa or anywhere else. All leaders, from "visionary" types down to the most venal kleptocrats, are products of social structures, i.e. organizations and networks. What needs to be done so that African social structures will identify and promote leaders who will entrench reforms and accelerate their countries' growth?
As economists we challenge our social science colleagues-sociologists, anthropologists, 
How (if at all) can outsiders contribute?
This is a difficult question. Overt encouragement, by outsiders, of leaders identified as "visionary" exposes them to attack by xenophobes and/or anti-reform interests, and risks lessening any chance they might have had to affect policy. Another BD finding is that, in countries with poor policies, aid has not accelerated economic growth, whereas in low-income countries with good policies, aid has increased the per capita GDP growth rate by roughly one-third. The World Bank and IMF have recently been somewhat more forthcoming. Examples, featuring collaboration with once equally timid bilateral donors, include the ultimatum over Zambian cabinet ministers, and insistence on legal action by Kenya against the Goldenberg perpetrators. In our view, donor support of TI and similar private initiatives could and should be carried further. The ending of the cold war has freed up intelligence assets that could help uncover and expose the best hidden and yet most important class of data, namely, transfer of bribery proceeds to numbered bank accounts and illicit acquisition of other foreign assets.
In cases of corrupt, non-"visionary" leadership, (i) withholding support…The

Helping "visionary" leaders implement reforms
The relevance here of BD's study depends on the extent to which an African country's pursuit of good policies overlaps with "visionary" leadership. BD's policy index has three components:
1. The Sachs-Warner dummy variable for trade openness, where an "open" economy's average tariffs on machinery and materials are 40% or less, the black market exchange rate premium does not exceed 20%, and pervasive government control of key tradables is absent;
2. The level of inflation is a proxy for monetary policy; and 3. Quality of fiscal policy is measured by the budget surplus and government consumption, both relative to GDP ("good" policy is defined as one standard deviation away from the sample mean-towards a positive surplus and lower government consumption).
A World Bank paper (WB 1998c) serving as background to BD (1997) uses the term "sound economic management" interchangeably with "good policies". "Management" has a greater connotation of "leadership" than does "policy". In a society with strong institutions and a 43 Account of Peter Eigen, TI president, at HIID seminar, Nov. 12, 1998. broad consensus regarding economic policy, "visionary" leadership by a president (or other senior official or small group of officials delegated by the chief executive) is less vital for achieving respectable economic performance. One need look only as far as the US-not all recent presidents could be characterized as "visionary" leaders.
On the other hand, African countries are not yet characterized by strong national institutions and broad policy consensus. Hence "visionary" leadership by a single individual with political power, or a small coterie to whom he/she delegates power, is critical to institutional development as well as to adopting and sustaining policies that will accelerate an African country's economic growth. So we return to the question: how best can outsiders encourage such leadership?
One way is to help the leader formulate and implement his/her policies, once he/she has assumed power. WB (1998b) summarizes the record here. Donors have long provided aid subject to policy conditionalities-structural adjustment lending (and grants) that started around 1980 embodies this approach. Sachs (1994) cites eight countries (none of them in Africa, to be sure)
where aid was a critical input in the reform process, helping "good governments to survive long enough to solve problems." By contrast, Rodrik (1996) argues that just as many cases can be cited of countries where aid enabled governments to delay reforms that impending economic collapse would otherwise have forced on them.
This divergence in country experiences poses an interesting dichotomy in regard to the connection between aid giving and "visionary" leadership in Africa. On the one hand, a case can be made for awarding the title of "most visionary leader of all" to one who believes traditional public foreign aid has impeded his/her country's development by creating a dependency relationship detrimental to adoption of pro-growth policies, as well as to mobilization of domestic talent and resources. Such a leader will be more inclined to devise an aid/debt "exit" strategy than to persuade donors to augment the aid flow. He/she will be more interested in foreign direct investment than official development assistance (ODA).
In the event such leaders appear in Africa, the outside world can be most supportive by helping design the strategy and arranging the resource flows needed to provide breathing space.
Above and beyond this, outsiders can engage in dialogue with the majority of leaders regarding the merits of adopting and pursuing an aid/debt exit strategy.
At the same time, we do not begrudge the title of "visionary" to a leader who believes the selective and efficient use of ODA can accelerate a healthy growth process by underwriting a larger human and physical capital stock than could otherwise be supported. Such a leader will devise and pursue a strategy to attract aid, which includes, among other things, pursuing reforms consistent with broad donor conditionalities.
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Another requirement for making outside support for reform effective is to phase disbursements under an aid instrument-notably the quick-disbursing variety comprising budget or balance of payments support-such that fulfillment of conditionalities can be assessed frequently and disbursements withheld if reforms are not implemented adequately. This has two advantages: firstly, it strengthens the hand of reform-minded leaders in implementing reforms over local opposition, secondly, it saves the donor money if it turns out the country leaders are not serious about reform.
Sachs (1994) also argues, again from non-African examples, that reform programs that succeeded in accelerating growth, whether or not supported by aid, have generated political momentum prolonging the lives of several "good" governments. Moreover, in institutional environments stronger than those found in most of Africa, success has imparted irreversibility to reform, so that formerly anti-reform leaders have ended up sustaining the reforms once they came to power. Thus, insofar as aid contributed to reform's success, it has helped make "visionary" leaders out of politicians formerly beholden to anti-reform interest groups.
Helping "visionary" leaders gain power
Can outsiders increase the chances of "visionary" leaders taking power in the first place?
In theory, if donors withhold aid from the corrupt, non-"visionary" leaders so prevalent in Africa today, the resulting disruption to the economy makes it more difficult for such individuals to remain in power, whether they are voted out in a system that permits relatively free elections, or forced out in a coup d'état or popular uprising. In practice, things often do not work out this way;
witness the many disappointing leaders who manage to hang on to power notwithstanding persistent economic crisis-even, in Kenya and Zambia, following restoration of multi-party electoral competition under donor pressure, and specifically in Zambia's case, despite the removal of the failed chief executive.
Arriving at a perception that "visionary" opposition leaders are likely to attract greater aid and thereby, as well as in other ways, improve economic performance, a well-informed public should award those leaders more votes, or take greater risks to support them in an uprising. But not many electorates in Africa (or in most other developing countries, for that matter) can yet be described as well informed in the sense of anticipating the eventual gains from liberalization and other components of economic reform. Moreover, after years of sustained economic failure, most African populations are risk-averse, as is evident in the variety of "coping" strategies widely used to raise the prospects of economic survival.
WB ( 4. "Engage civil society. In highly distorted environments the government is failing to provide supportive policies and effective services… Support civil society to pressure the government to change or to take service provision directly into its own hands…"
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Once more out of diplomatic nicety, the World Bank is excluded from publishing names and other particulars of situations in which the Bank and other donors have applied such measures and thereby succeeded in dislodging corrupt, non-"visionary" leaders. Suffice it to refer back to our earlier Table 1 , which suggests that progress has been slow. Moreover, included in the table are a number of one-time opposition leaders who switched once they took power.
Like aid, honesty, integrity and commitment are fungible. Fomenting change is an imprecise and precarious activity.
45 WB (1998b) , p. 104.
The long run-human capital formation and institution building
It is an article of faith in the development community that increased investment in education will generate a more enlightened electorate and strengthen a country's institutions of governance, along with the capacity of its socio-political structures to produce strong, "visionary" leaders. This notwithstanding the fact that estimates of the internal rate of return of educational expenditure in Africa, based on differential earnings during graduates' working lives, have tended to decline over time. Thus, to the extent donors invest in education in Africa, they are incidentally helping to build leadership capacity in the long run. 
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Whatever the weight of the evidence, the authors are convinced that the majority of African governments undertaking structural adjustment would soon have found themselves with less real resources to use in all sectors, including education, had they failed to deal with fiscal and international payments imbalances.
V. Conclusion
The main issue addressed in this paper is whether the quality of national leadership is relevant to evaluating the progress of African countries towards sustained economic growth. We inquire whether it is conceivable (i) that "visionary" leaders, Ceteris paribus, the greater the power and stability of the interest groups anticipating harm from market-oriented reforms, the harder it is for the leader to assert him or herself.
Conversely, the stronger and more visionary the leader, the better he/she will be able to manipulate and compensate the groups, while nurturing budding interest groups that anticipate net benefits from the reforms.
Our research leads us to believe that a large number, possibly most African countries have been ruled by leaders who had sufficient power to implement reforms had they been motivated to do so. However, their motivation led them in different directions. As a result, policy reforms have been implemented haltingly, with frequent reversals. In a sense, this outcome represents the triumph of groups "interest"ed only in aggrandizement and the appeasement of their hangers-on-family members, friends, and associates whose political support is bought by sharing the loot.
To the extent that this is true, it follows that:
• shortcomings of national leadership in economic policy represent a highly relevant issue in Africa; • the relative dearth of pro-growth leaders has been and continues to be extremely costly to the populations of most African countries; and • this dearth is an issue meriting research that goes beyond traditional interest-group analysis.
The key question that we find demanding research: is there anything specific to the current African socio-political environment that retards the emergence of leaders with qualities such as those identified with Harberger's "heroes" or others cited in our literature review?
We have argued that outsiders, notably donors, exercise variable influence over the settings that nurture "visionary" leaders. So far, this influence has proven to be asymmetrical, in the sense that donors have contributed much more to helping corrupt, non-"visionary" leaders hold on to power, than they have contributed to nurturing "visionary" pro-growth leaders.
As long as the World Bank's concept of "a long-term vision of systemic change" can be interpreted to encompass preparation of an aid/debt exit strategy, we believe the Bank's rules of thumb for effective donor intervention in support of growth policy can do double duty as guidelines for outside nurturing of "visionary" leaders in Africa. Nevertheless, experience cautions against optimism that the guidelines will yield quick results.
In addition to nurturing from outside, one must hope that Africa's evolving social structures-organizations and networks-will provide opportunities for more "visionary" individuals with the power to assert themselves over incumbent leaders. It may also not be amiss to hope that outright luck will favor the random appearance of a few more strong, "visionary" leaders than have recently graced the landscape.
Leadership is not easily defined or described i . Moreover, the definitions and descriptions have changed over time.
In the scriptures, we read ii :
If ... refers to the quality of the behavior of the individuals whereby they guide people or their activities in organized effort.
Modern treatments have moved away from the characteristics of leaders and their behavior. Emphasis shifted to the various "situations" or "contexts" within which leadership is exercised vii . There have also been explicit efforts to reverse gender bias evident in earlier discussions of leadership viii . In McGregor Burns' view, "...leaders are a particular kind of power holder". For de Vries, however, the basic issue was effective leadership. This, he noted "... strongly depends on a complex pattern of interaction among leaders, followers, and situation" x . He argued that "effective leaders are very good at building alliances and creating commitment so that others will share their vision" xi . This approach allowed de Vries to identify and examine situations when leadership goes awry. He was particularly interested in the pathologies and irrationality that characterize poorly functioning, or (as he termed them) "neurotic" organizations xii .
The management literature has made a clear distinction between managers and leaders. On this point, Zaleznik noted xiii :
... a crucial difference between managers and leaders lies in the conceptions they hold, deep in their psyches, of chaos and order. Leaders tolerate chaos and lack of structure and are thus prepared to keep answers in suspense, avoiding premature closure on important issues. Managers seek order and controls and are almost compulsively addicted to disposing of problems even before they understand their potential significance.
Kotter's discussion of "what leaders really do" has a similar theme xiv :
Management is about coping with complexity... Leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change.
Expert opinion diverges on whether leadership can be learned or is "instinctive". Drucker was adamant:
Leadership is of utmost importance. Indeed there is no substitute for it. But leadership cannot be created or promoted. It cannot be taught or learned xv .
Some who share Drucker's view emphasize the "artistry" in leadership. They see leaders as having special qualities and faculties that are not easily transferred or not readily acquired xvi .
Other management specialists disagree. For example, Zaleznik, provided numerous examples of how leaders have been nurtured and supported within large organizations. He noted that all military leaders emerge from within the system. xvii Heifetz and Laurie were more direct. They argue that:
Leadership has to take place every day. It cannot be the responsibility of the few, a rare event, or a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity xviii .
They continue:
Leadership, ..., requires a learning strategy. A leader, ..., has to engage people in confronting the challenge, adjusting their values, changing perspectives, and learning new habits xix .
In their opinion, leaders learn as they encourage others. This is part of the challenge of being or becoming a leader. Those who do not learn, as they challenge others, fail. Indeed, the point is more general. The essence of reform is that the people involved and the systems they are part of undergo fundamental change. Reformers are those who are willing to change their perceptions and presumptions in order to adapt to the changing reality xx .
This sentiment was captured in Walter Lippman's tribute to Franklin Roosevelt xxi :
The final test of a leader is that he leaves behind him in other men the conviction and the will to carry on.
Leaders in Africa:
Where in Africa are the men who have left such a legacy over the last four decades? xxii Leopold Senghor was one of the few heads of state who understood that a fundamental requirement of good leadership is the ability to hand over power xxiii . General Olusegun Obasanjo did the same in Nigeria. In doing so, he provided that country with the opportunity (later squandered) to move beyond military dictatorship. Perhaps his recent election will allow that troubled nation to move forward.
xxiv Sir Quett Ketumile Masire recently retired in Botswana after a career in which his country, democratic and peaceful, prospered as no other African country has. Finally, Nelson Mandela moves towards retirement having demonstrated, through the strength of his character and generosity of his spirit, that a "New" South Africa could become a reality.
Beyond these few, the ranks thin out rapidly. Indeed, the legacy of the various dreamers, thugs, and kleptocrats who have charmed, tyrannized, and pillaged populations across Africa over the last four decades, has been economic collapse.
xxv Their failed leadership is evident in the "neurotic organizations" and those who have been left behind who operate within them. Rather than rebuild and re-direct the shattered economies and societies, their successors have added to the mayhem.
Endnotes to the Annex
i This is evident in the works of McGregor Burns (1978) and Rosen (1996) and the collection of essays on leadership assembled by Grint (1997) and the Harvard Business Review (1998) . A similar point is made by Kets de Vries (1994) , reprinted in Grint (1997) , when he referred to Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership (Bass 1981) with its 5000 references on the topic.
ii The following quotes may be found in Mencken A New Dictionary of Quotations 1942, p.670.
iii Hill and Ottchen 1991, pp.65, 152 iv Barnard (1948) Organization and Management in Grint (1997, p.91) .
vii Fielder 1978 viii See the contributions by Bass and Avolio (1994) , Rosener (1995) , and Calas and Smircich (1991) , respectively, chapters 10, 11, and 17 in Grint (1997 For leaders who are caught up in a web of irrationality at the head of a neurotic organization, escape is not easy. In most cases, they cannot break out of their self-constructed prison alone. They are the captives of their character and they will need some kind of professional help to break the chains that restrict their behavior and lead to dysfunctional organizations. Leaders must recognize the potential destructiveness of their actions, and understand the extent to which past experiences can influence their present and future behavior. ... These people make the same mistakes over and over again because they are unable to recognize certain repetitive patterns in their behavior which have become dysfunctional. xiii Zaleznik 1977, reprinted Drucker 1982:194 xvi The leader most often associated with this idea is Napoleon. Yet, while it is easy to see the boldness, spontaneity, and intuition in what he accomplished, the comparison between Napoleon and Wellington offers a stark contrast in "leadership styles" (Pears in Grint 1997:Ch.12 ).
xvii Argyris (1991) makes the case that not only can an organization's top staff be taught, they have to be if the organization is to continue to thrive. xviii Heifetz and Laurie 1998, p.196 
